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FAUSTIAN BARGAINS:
ENTANGLEMENTS BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE IN
AMERICA
STEVEN ALAN SAMSON*
Abstract
As the state extends its operations into all areas of social life, it breaches the
protective 'wall of separation' that has traditionally kept the church free from
overt regulation by the civil authorities. This is manifested in several ways:
first, a statutory extension of state police powers through social legislation;
second, a restriction or pre-emption of certain activities that were once held
to be outside the purview of the state; third, a vitiation of the principle of
religious non-interference through judicial interpretations of the First
Amendment; and fourth, an adversary posture toward churches taken by
many agencies of the state while pursuing their regulatory objectives. As a
consequence, churches are facing novel restraints on their ecclesiastical or
corporate rights, immunities, and privileges. Originally written in 1984, this
piece is updated by a brief review of subsequent developments that
addressed many of these concerns.

I INTRODUCTION
Two subjects most apt to be avoided in polite conversation are religion and
politics. The reasons are not hard to fathom. We express our values and
views in mixed company at the risk of exposing our identity: perhaps also
our ignorance. Explanations are most easily avoided by a circumspect
silence. As citizens of an increasingly pluralistic America, we put a
*

Professor, Helms School of Government, Liberty University, Lynchburg, Virginia.
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premium on anonymity and privacy with regard to personal convictions.1
Consequently, these most public of commitments – religion and politics –
are kept most private and guarded as Rumpelstiltskin guarded his name.
Matters of faith tend to be consigned to a tacit dimension of being: a
Homeric netherworld of the sort once inhabited by shades of the Greek
dead.

Religion in particular is becoming more mystic or ineffable,

confirming psychologically a dualism in our thinking that has been
embraced by modern philosophy. Ludwig Wittgenstein concluded his
Tractatus on this rather diffident note: „What we cannot speak about we
must pass over in silence.‟2 J. Glenn Gray has characterized the abstraction
of modern social life as a consequence of its godlessness.3

1

This contrasts with the earlier emphasis on cultural life in which politics and religion
were the great issues. See Guillaume Groen van Prinsterer, Unbelief in Religion and
Politics, ed. and trans. Henry Van Dyke (Amsterdam: The Groen van Prinsterer Fund,
1975), 16: „Lamennais writes correctly: 'There are truths and errors which are at once
religious and political, since religion and society have the same origin, namely God,
and the same end, namely man. Thus a fundamental error in religion is also a
fundamental error in politics, and vice versa.'‟ See also Richard E. Morgan, The
Politics of Religious Conflict: Church and State in America (New York: Pegasus,
1968), 21-23, on the close affinity between mainline Protestant and secularist
perceptions with regard to church and state.
2
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 2nd ed., trans. D. F. Pears and
B. F. McGuinness (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961), 151. Working within
the tradition of Kantian philosophy, Wittgenstein made an absolute distinction
between facts and values that led to a kind of „ethical mysticism.‟ Allan Janik and
Stephen Toulmin, Wittgenstein's Vienna (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1973), 15061, 232-35. This resolution of the dualism of fact and value is comparable to the
„semantic mysticism‟ that, according to some critics, characterizes so much of modern
theology. See Hazel E. Barnes, An Existentialist Ethics (New York: Vintage Books,
1967), 379-99.
3
J. Glenn Gray, The Warriors: Reflections on Men in Battle (New York: Harper & Row,
1959; Perennial Library, 1973), xxii. Gray, an American existentialist philosopher,
regarded this change as an increasingly negative development.
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II RELIGION AND POLITICS
We are confronted by a twin paradox in America today:

the private

Christian and the private citizen. In a bygone generation, the Christian
gospel was openly proclaimed abroad in the land.

Christianity was

recognized as part of the common law. Today, the proclamation is muted
and the recognition of our Christian legal tradition is indistinct, even in the
churches.

The public religiosity of an earlier era has retreated from

community life. A malaise has settled over the civil pageantry of the
boisterous young republic that once marked time with seven league boots.
Even the obligatory lip service paid to civic virtue by dubious politicians
and doubtful citizens has grown cold.4 Shakespeare's Brutus suggested a
diagnosis for times like ours:
When love begins to sicken and decay,
It useth an enforced ceremony.
There are no tricks in plain and simple faith:
But hollow men, like horses hot at hand,
Make gallant show and promise of their mettle;
4

Borrowing a page from George Santayana, Leo Marx characterized the switch from a
religious to a pragmatic emphasis in American letters as a change of language from
the civil religion of the genteel tradition to the vernacular of the „cruder, more
colloquial, closer to the raw, often profane particularities of everyday life in the West.‟
Marx quoted Ralph Waldo Emerson to the effect that „the corruption of man is
followed by a corruption of language‟ and reiterated George Orwell's maxim that „the
great enemy of clear language is insincerity.‟ Leo Marx, „The Uncivil Response of
American Writers to Civil Religion in America,‟ in American Civil Religion, ed.
Russell E. Richey and Donald G. Jones (New York: Harper & Row, 1974), 226-27.
These observations may be compared with Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy, Speech and
Reality (Norwich, Vt.: Argo Books, 1970), 10. While Gilbert Keith Chesterton once
complimented America as the only nation founded upon a creed, he similarly warned
against an insincere solemnity that is so often associated with church life. He
regretted the weakness and weariness he saw in American politics and regarded them
as evidence of decadence. See Sidney E. Mead, „The „Nation with the Soul of a
Church,‟‟ in Richey and Jones, op. cit., 45; Gilbert K. Chesterton, Heretics, 3rd ed.
(New York: John Lane Company, 1906), 216-31, 263-66.
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But when they should endure the bloody spur,
They fall their crests, and, like deceitful jades,
Sink in the trial.5

We live in an age of transition. Sporadic church attendance and low voter
turnouts each express a growing disdain for any sort of confessionalism or
civic obligation. Where once a confident public philosophy held court,6 a
strident skepticism has displaced the fairly broad moral consensus that,
according to James Hitchcock, prevailed „until sometime after 1960.‟

While there were inevitable disagreements over values, in retrospect these
seem to have been relatively minor in scope, occurring within an accepted
framework of belief. To cite one particularly sensitive example, the nation
was overwhelmingly family-oriented. Hence there was general agreement
about the undesirability of divorce, unmarried cohabitation, homosexuality,
and other practices. However common they may have been in actuality,
there was little inclination to defend them in theory. Agencies of public
expression, like the schools and the mass media, tended overwhelmingly to
honor this moral consensus.7

5

Julius Caesar, act 4, sc. 2, lines 20-27.
Walter Lippmann, Essays in the Public Philosophy (Boston: Little, Brown &
Company, 1955; New York: New American Library), 136-37, attempted to
reformulate the earlier theistic public philosophy in terms that would be acceptable to
an agnostic generation since, as he acknowledged, „public philosophy is in large
measure discredited among contemporary men.‟
7
James Hitchcock, „Competing Ethical Systems,‟ Imprimis, April 1981, 1. Harold
Berman, who argues for a religious and against an instrumental conception of law,
believes that a profound shift toward an exclusively secular theory of law has taken
place during the last two generations. As a result, law is becoming unenforceable to
the extent that it is seen merely as something expedient or arbitrary. „If law is to be
measured only by standards of experience, or workability, and not by standards of
truth or rightness, then it will be difficult to enforce it against those who think it does
not serve their interests . . . . One who rules by law is not compelled to be everywhere
with his police force. I think this point is proved today in a negative way by the fact
that in our cities that branch of the law in which the sanctions are most severe, namely
6
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Indeed, this consensus was securely established within our legal system,
despite some signs of fraying at the edges even before the 1960s. A radical
shattering of this outwardly Christian set of expectations scarcely could
have been anticipated. The current fragmentation of values is being viewed
positively within what Hitchcock calls the „new pluralism‟ as a means to
effect the transition from one orthodoxy to another.
While the call for “pluralism” is ostensibly merely a call for tolerance – a
request that the reigning orthodoxy make room for newer “points of view” –
in practice an orthodoxy which loses its authority has trouble even retaining
the right of toleration. Although it is still extended bare legal toleration, in
practice it finds itself more and more on the defensive, its very right to exist
challenged in numerous ways.8
the criminal law, has been powerless to create fear when it has failed to create respect
by other means.‟ Harold Berman, „The Interaction of Law and Religion,‟ Mercer Law
Review, 31 (1980): 409.
8
Ibid., 2. See also Gary North, „The Intellectual Schizophrenia of the New Christian
Right,‟ Christianity and Civilization, 1 (Spring 1982): 23: „Education is deeply
religious. So is any system of legislation. We cannot escape religion. There is no
neutrality. Everyone uses the neutrality doctrine in order to create his own version of
theocracy: humanist theocracy (man is God), Marxist theocracy (the proletariat is
God), anarchist theocracy (the free market is God), or whatever. They use the
doctrine of religious liberty to enthrone an anti-Christian social order -- an order
which does not allow Christians to establish their God-ordained theocracy. (I am
using theocracy here as „the rule of God,‟ not the rule of ordained priests or the
institutional church.) In short, those using the religious liberty argument say that they
are maintaining a society open to all religions, when in fact it will be a society closed
to the God of the Bible and His law-order.‟ The experience of churches in the Soviet
Union may serve as an illustration. Religious liberty was constitutionally guaranteed
but the teaching of religion to children is prohibited to all except their parents.
Vladimir Gsovski pointed out in the 1930s that Soviet policy was to dismember the
old Orthodox establishment into isolated local units and deprive churches of their
property holdings. Although the use of church buildings was granted by local soviets
free of charge, members of the church were required to assume all financial
responsibilities: taxes, fees, and obligatory insurance payments. Congregations were
not allowed to incorporate and, for a time, members of the clergy were disfranchised.
Vladimir Gsovski, „Legal Status of the Church in Soviet Russia,‟ Fordham Law
Review, 8 (1939): 1-28. The 1977 Soviet Constitution contained the following
provision in Article 52: „In the USSR the church is separate from the state, and the
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The bedrock of this older orthodoxy was an accommodation between
church and state designed to maintain standards of law and morality based
on Christianity. The disestablishment of the state churches appears to have
been originally intended to strengthen rather than impair the cooperation
between church and state as institutions. This is attested by numerous court
rulings, including the decision of the Supreme Court of New York in the
case of People v. Ruggles, 8 Johnson 296, 297 (1811):

Though the constitution has discarded religious establishments, it does not
forbid judicial cognisance of those offences against religion and morality
which have no reference to any such establishment, or to any particular form
of government, but are punishable because they strike at the root of moral
obligation and weaken the security of the social ties . . . . The legislative
exposition of the constitution is conformable to this view of it.

Here the Court noted at 296-97 that „the people of this state, in common
with the people of this country, profess the general doctrines of christianity
as the rule of their faith and practice . . . .‟ Although the political system is
not derived from any particular statement of religious doctrine, it was
predominantly Christian in its legal assumptions, moral values, and
religious sympathies.9

Today, however, there is strong evidence of a growing separation of the
school is separate from the church.‟ Robert Sharlet, The New Soviet Constitution of
1977: Analysis and Text (Brunswick, OH: King's Court Communications, 1978), 93.
9
See H. B. Clark, Biblical Law: Being a Text of the Statutes, Ordinances, and
Judgments Established in the Holy Bible -- With Many Allusions to Secular Laws:
Ancient, Medieval and Modern -- Documented to the Scriptures, Judicial Decisions
and Legal Literature (Portland, OR: Binfords & Mort, 1943), 36-41.
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American legal and political system as a whole from its original, basically
Christian, presuppositions. This trend raises questions of both a theoretical
and practical nature concerning the nature and direction of the change.10
The object of this study is to analyse and evaluate the implications of
current public policy concerning the relationship of church and state and to
do so in the context of a Christian philosophy of history, law, and
government.

III CHURCH, STATE, AND SOVEREIGNTY
The central questions of philosophy often lie at the frontiers of several
disciplines. The problem of delineating the proper spheres of church and
state, for instance, raises issues of great consequence in the fields of law,
theology, political theory, and economics. The institutional conflicts
between church and state nevertheless point to an even more fundamental
question about the proper source of authority to which each may appeal:
Who or what wields ultimate power in society? This is the question of
sovereignty. It asks: What is the court of last resort? Where does the buck
stop? The answers of philosophers and statesmen throughout history have
been varied and often irreconcilable: the polis, the people, the king, the
constitution, the church, humanity, destiny, and God. For our purposes
here, the options ultimately boil down to two: God or Caesar.
10

In commenting on a book by Herman Wouk, Robert Ulich remarks: „The author
rightly believes that the Jewish people would not have survived the long years of
persecution without faithful adherence to their rituals, festivals, and prayers. May
then not the loss of the Christian past not jeopardize the future of this nation, just as
the desertion from the covenant would have jeopardized the survival of the Jews?
Nations, as well as men, though living by bread, do not live by bread alone.‟ Paul A.
Freund and Robert Ulich, Religion and the Public Schools (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1965), 40. See Berman, „Interaction,‟ Mercer Law Review, 405-13.
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Our American forebears were faced with the delicate task of founding and
properly outfitting a new system of government that would distribute
authority, protect liberty, and simultaneously guard against the abuses of
both. By the time of the Declaration of Independence, the concept of legal
sovereignty that had for so long been claimed by kings and parliaments was
thoroughly discredited.11 It is noteworthy that the Constitution does not
even use the word sovereignty and, instead, reserves for itself the more
modest status of „supreme law of the land,‟ a concept that may be traced
back to the Bible through the Magna Charta.12 The founders recognized
11

See, for example, Harold J. Laski, Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1917), 267-75; and Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition
in America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought Since the Revolution
(New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1955), 44-45. On the term „political
sovereignty,‟ see John Courtney Murray, We Hold These Truths: Catholic Reflections
on the American Proposition (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1960), 70-71: „Nowhere
in the American structure is there accumulated the plenitude of legal sovereignty
possessed in England by the Queen in Parliament. In fact, the term 'legal sovereignty'
makes no sense in America, where sovereignty (if the alien term must be used) is
purely political. The United States has a government, or better, a structure of
governments operating on different levels. The American state has no sovereignty in
the classic continental sense. Within society, as distinct from the state, there is room
for the independent exercise of an authority which is not of the state. This principle
has more than once been affirmed by American courts, most recently by the Supreme
Court in the Kedroff case. The validity of this principle strengthens the stability of the
Church's condition at law.‟ See Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94
(1952). But an unfortunate consequence of the inability or unwillingness by the courts
to take faithfulness to doctrinal standards into consideration – as in Kedroff – is that
they are often unable to provide relief to an orthodox faction seeking to prevent a
congregational or denominational takeover. Corporation and property laws place the
burden of responsibility on churches and denominations to anticipate and protect
themselves against any such eventuality. Many churches are wary of the implications
of incorporating, submitting to regulation, or turning to the secular courts.
12
See Helen Silving, „The Origins of the Magnae Cartae,‟ Harvard Journal of
Legislation, 3 (1965): 117-31. Reprinted in Helen Silving, Sources of Law (Buffalo,
NY: William S. Hein and Co., 1968), 237-49. Thomas J. Higgins, Judicial Review
Unmasked (West Hanover, MA: Christopher Publishing House, 1981), 51-52, deals
with the difficulty of trying to reconcile a separation of powers with the concept of
political sovereignty.
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that ultimate authority must be located at a point beyond human
intervention and, hence, beyond politics.

Noah Webster expressed a

Christian understanding of sovereignty when he illustrated the word in his
definition: „Absolute sovereignty belongs to God only.‟13 Without this
common understanding, the question of who wields ultimate power
necessarily becomes the supreme object of political contention.

The constitutional protection of the church from intervention by the state is
a revolutionary idea. From the earliest days of the church, monarchs had
often claimed authoritative powers in matters of church doctrine and
government. The authority of the Roman emperor as the supreme pontiff
over the state religion was maintained to some degree even as the empire
became nominally Christian, though it was expressly repudiated by the
Christian emperor, Gratian.

During the centuries that followed, emperors, popes, and kings fought to
possess the keys to the kingdom of God. The American historian, Sanford
H. Cobb, could thus remark with some justification that, in light of the long
history of political absolutism, „this pure religious liberty may be justly
rated as the great gift of America to civilization and the world. . . .‟14
Although Americans tend to take this gift for granted today, the proper
juxtaposition of church and state is still an unsettled question.

Some degree of political divisiveness is to be expected when the place of
13

Noah Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language, vol. 2 (New York:
S. Converse, 1828; San Francisco: Foundation for American Christian Education,
1967), 76.
14
Sanford H. Cobb, The Rise of Religious Liberty: A History (New York: Macmillan,
1902; Burt Franklin, 1970), 2.
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the church in society is discussed because it involves the issue of ultimate
allegiance. With the secularization of our cultural institutions, people's
expectations about the interaction of church and state have changed.15
Many Americans now regard the church as an unrepresentative special
interest group and thus expect it to play a subordinate, even invisible, role
in public affairs.

This attitude is probably nearly as prevalent among

church members as among non-members.

Pluralism is frequently prescribed as an antidote to the divisiveness of
religious orthodoxies and enjoys a favourable image as a common
denominator or neutral value.16 According to Sidney Mead, it was the
pluralist vision of a „cosmopolitan, inclusive, universal theology‟ that
guided the founders.17 Similarly, it was an avowedly non-sectarian
Christian moralism rather than religious skepticism that motivated Horace
Mann and other supporters of the public education movement early in the
nineteenth century.18 But now that religion is generally considered to be a
private affair, the church as an institution is today being relegated to the
fringes of an avowedly pluralistic secular society. In his study of the
phenomenon of revolution during the last thousand years of western
history, Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy detected a gradual reversal in the
identity of the public and private realms:

15

David Martin, A General Theory of Secularization (New York: Harper and Row,
1978), 278-80.
16
See Mead, „Nation,‟ in American Civil Religion, ed. Richey and Jones, 54-55, which
distinguishes nonconformity from secularism.
17
Ibid, 55.
18
See Rousas John Rushdoony, The Messianic Character of American Education:
Studies in the History of the Philosophy of Education (Nutley, NJ: The Craig Press,
1963).
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Church and economy have changed their places during the last thousand
years . . . . The universal church becomes more and more particular in her
operations; economy becomes more and more universally organized. We
still pray for One Catholic Church. The real trouble of the future will be,
whether we can pray for it sincerely or not. It is true that for ten centuries
the nations carried both visions, the vision of local rights and private
property, and the vision of a universal realm of peace. Private property is
being attacked today on the same ground as the unity of faith. Both ideals
are imperilled. Bolshevism is radical enough to make the church a private
affair for the individual, and property the public affair of the community.
But the question is not dependent on any subjective theory about Marxism.
It is an issue for any government which subsidizes industry, taxes private
educational institutions, propagates political ideas, or repopulates its
deserted villages with self-subsisting homesteads.19

Indeed, some secularists nurture a hope that the church will eventually die
of sheer irrelevance if it is left isolated and unacknowledged.20

Ironically, the problem of reconciling the claims of church and state may be
a more urgent one for a nominally secular society than for one in which
religion officially plays a leading civic role. In the days when sovereignty
was regarded as a transcendent concept, church and state at least had a
common religious reference and a common source of appeal in Scripture,
even though they may have competed for control of the civil sword from
time to time.21 Now that sovereignty has been brought down to earth in the
19

Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy, Out of Revolution: Autobiography of Western Man (New
York: William Morrow and Company, 1938), 496.
20
See, for example, John D. Dunphy, „A Religion for a New Age,‟ The Humanist,
January/February, 1983, 23-26. See also James Hitchcock, What is Secular
Humanism?: Why Humanism Is Becoming Secular and How It Is Changing Our
World (Ann Arbor, MI: Servant Books, 1982), 105.
21
See Sidney E. Mead, The Lively Experiment: The Shaping of Christianity in America
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name of the people, there is good reason to doubt that any institution
remains sufficiently independent of the state to guarantee freedom of
religion, or any other freedom, beyond the merest „considerations of what
is expedient for the community itself.‟22
The business of determining „community standards‟ is inherently moral or
religious in nature. Indeed, morality is just as readily legislated as it is
preached or taught. If, in fact, religiosity and morality are basic human
traits, secularity and amorality are not their opposites. The rejection of one
system of values and beliefs only indicates that it has been replaced by
another system considered more acceptable, believable, or valuable. If the
really salient issue were the establishment of religion, what would be
gained by a community if, in disestablishing the church, it simply
established the state in its place?23 When the state itself is sovereign, what
(New York: Harper & Row, 1963), 59. For illustrations of this common religious
reference, see B. F. Morris, Christian Life and Character of the Civil Institutions of
the United States, Developed in the Official and Historical Annals of the Republic
(Philadelphia: George W. Childs, 1864).
22

Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law, ed. Mark DeWolfe Howe (Boston:
Little, Brown, and Company, 1963), 32. Similarly, Woodrow Wilson „believed that
laws must be adjusted to fit facts 'because the law . . . is the expression of the facts in
legal relationships. Laws have never altered the facts; laws have always necessarily
expressed the facts.‟‟ Quoted in Herbert Schlossberg, Idols for Destruction: Christian
Faith and Its Confrontation with American Society (Nashville, TN: Thomas Nelson
Publishers, 1983), 14. American legal philosophy tends toward a pragmatism that
appears to be descended from scholastic nominalism. In its historicism, it recalls what
G. E. Moore called „the naturalistic fallacy.‟ See William K. Frankena, Ethics
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1963), 81-82.
23
Abraham Kuyper, Lectures on Calvinism (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans
Publishing Company, 1931), 96-99, expresses concern about a tendency for the
modern state to take the place of the church. Richard John Neuhaus, „Law and the
Rightness of Things,‟ Valparaiso Law Review, 14 (1979): 12, raises a similar concern:
„This is precisely the cultural crisis of our society: the popularly accessible and vibrant
belief systems and worldviews of our society are largely excluded from the public
arena in which the decisions are made about how the society should be ordered . . . .
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institution is sufficiently independent to stand apart from the state as a
court of last resort fully equipped to assure civil and religious liberty? This
is the dilemma posed by any establishment of religion by the state.

This is not to deny that disestablishment has created its share of difficulties.
Even though Christianity still outwardly prevails as the majority religion,
our accustomed religious liberty has furnished a rich soil for doctrinal
innovations. Otto Scott's analysis suggests some of the perplexities that
confront historians as they interpret the nature of American religion:

The United States was a government whose constitution claimed no higher
authority than its own laws. That was essentially a lawyer's concept of
civilization, and could be traced not to the church, but to Roman tradition.
The novelty of a nation without an official religion was not fully appreciated
in 1830 -- for no land was as crowded with churches and no people more
prone to use religious terminology and Christian references in everyday
speech, in their writings, and in their thinking, than the Americans. There
was no question of the piety of millions. There was equally little doubt that
they did not fully realize that a land with no religious center is a land where
religion is what anyone chooses to claim.24

With apologies to Spinoza, transcendence abhors a vacuum. Today there is such a
vacuum in the public space of American law and politics. Unless it is democratically
filled by the living moral tradition of the American people, it will surely be filled, as
has so tragically happened elsewhere, by the pretensions of the modern state. As the
crisis of legitimacy deepens, it will lead – not next year, maybe not in twenty years,
but all too soon – to totalitarianism or to insurrection, or to both.‟
24

Otto J. Scott, The Secret Six: John Brown and the Abolitionist Movement (New York:
Times Books, 1979), 97. But other commentators, like Philip Schaff in the late
nineteenth century, strongly disagreed with critics who charged the constitutional
system with „political atheism.‟ It is important to realize, however, that this was
largely a controversy among professing Christians. See Philip Schaff, Church and
State in the United States: or The American Idea of Religious Liberty and Its Practical
Effects, Papers of the American Historical Association, vol. 2, no. 4 (New York: G.
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The varieties of religious expression are paralleled by the seemingly
endless permutations to public law that attempt to accommodate them. No
cultural vacuum remains unfilled for very long. The retreat of the church
from many of its earlier social welfare and education commitments has
been matched by the advance of the state in these same areas. The one has
catalysed the other. But the state has also come to be regarded as a vehicle
for promoting civil and religious unity and universality. 25 World history is
the story of successive empires that have aspired to universal dominion in
one form or another, among them Assyria, Babylon, Persia, Greece, Rome,
Islam, Germany, Mongolia, Spain, England, France, the Axis, America,
and Russia.

IV THE MYTH OF NEUTRALITY
America has long been a prolific breeding ground for new cults. In the
absence of a healthy civil religion, almost anything goes. The Harvard
sociologist, Pitirim Sorokin, characterized this phenomenon as “chaotic
syncretism,” which he attributed to the decomposition of an „overripe
sensate culture.‟26 Indeed, religious pluralism is just as problematic in its
own way as the old church establishments once were for the American
colonists. This is most strikingly reflected in the high level of litigation
over church-state issues. The guarantee of religious free exercise upsets
the status quo, especially once it is accepted as a distinct value apart from
Putnam's Sons, 1888), 38-43.
Rosenstock-Huessy, Revolution, 493-95.
26
Pitirim A. Sorokin, The Crisis of Our Age: The Social and Cultural Outlook (New
York: E. Dutton and Co., 1941), 241-52.
25
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its original purpose of protecting dissenters – mainly Christian – from
existing church establishments.

Regarding matters of religious belief and practice, the state today affects an
attitude of disinterested neutrality. In a series of decisions, the Supreme
Court has held that every government activity must be guided by a secular
purpose and have a neutral „primary effect that neither advances nor
inhibits religion.‟27 But these tests are not as straight-forward as they might
appear to be for the simple reason that the effective spheres of political and
religious activity cannot be neatly compartmentalized. Both politics and
religion are comprehensive in their reach. Above all, they are inclusive;
they are first of all inclusive even where they appear exclusive. Both are
unavoidably value-laden. Neither is neutral in its effects, whether these are
primary or subsidiary. Indeed, all perception, thought, and action begins
with biases, presuppositions, or predilections.28 Whether in theory or in
practice, neither the state nor the church is apt to always agree which are
the things of God and which are the things of Caesar (Matt. 22:21),
assuming they even attempt to draw a meaningful distinction between the
secular and the sacred. If Christian believers are to „Render . . . to all their
dues‟ (Rom. 13:7), then some yardstick is required to determine what is
due to each. It is a problem of jurisdiction.

This problem of jurisdiction has been compounded by the divided state of
the church. Public policy unavoidably differentiates among and differently
affects the perceptions and practices of different churches and church
27
28

Abington School District v Schempp (1963) 274 U.S. 222.
See Cornelius Van Til, In Defense of Biblical Christianity, vol.2: A Survey of
Christian Epistemology (Nutley, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing
Company, 1977), 4-6.
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communicants. What may be regarded as welcome assistance by some
may be regarded as an unwelcome intrusion by others. Some religious
traditions, like Puritanism, are militantly reformational. Others, like the
Social Gospel and liberation theology, concentrate on the transformation of
social institutions. Anabaptists, such as the Mennonites, generally tend
toward strict separationism and political quietism. 29 Others, among them
Roman Catholics, seek close cooperation between church and state.30
Religious liberty means something very different in each case.

Particular laws and policies burden the members of some sects more than
others. When class legislation was still the exception rather than the rule,
relief was usually sought in the form of exemptions or favourable court
rulings. But exemptions have come to be treated as privileges rather than
immunities; and court rulings have become highly unpredictable and
subjective in the absence of a clear interpretative tradition.31

General

policy legislation invariably imposes hardships on those who, for legitimate
religious reasons, cannot or will not comply. These hardships may be
further aggravated by overly stringent and sometimes quite logical
renderings of the vagaries of legislative language into administrative
practice. A simple turn of phrase or an undefined term may inspire novel

29

See John Howard Yoder, The Christian Witness to the State. Institute of Mennonite
Studies, Number 3 (Newton, KS: Faith and Life Press, 1964); Willem Balke, Calvin
and the Anabaptist Radicals, trans. William Heynen (Grand Rapids, MI: William B.
Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1981), 59-65, 260-65.
30
See Robert E. Webber, The Secular Saint: A Case for Evangelical Social
Responsibility (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House, 1979), 75-165.
31
Walfred H. Peterson, Thy Liberty in Law (Nashville, TN: Broadman Press, 1977),
151, 156-59, notes the importance of personality factors in judicial interpretation. See
also Rousas John Rushdoony, „The War Against Christ's Kingdom,‟ A Special
Chalcedon Alert, no. 1, January 1982.
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The courts are then placed in the position of

having to referee the competing claims of government officials, private
citizens, and churches.

The earlier cooperation that characterized the relationship of church and
state was followed in this century by an era of relatively benign indulgence
or accommodation. But by the late 1970s prominent religious leaders were
expressing their concern that the relationship was becoming increasingly
confrontational. Numerous books and articles appeared that criticized what
the authors regarded as gratuitous regulatory interference in areas formerly
left to church control.32

Significant numbers of church members had

become persuaded that incidents involving licensure and certification
requirements for church-operated schools and day care facilities, demands
for church records by revenue agencies, restrictions on property use by
zoning authorities, and bureaucratic stipulations concerning the proportion
of time devoted to “religious” as opposed to “secular” activities were not
simply unforeseen by-products of more general policy changes, or
unfortunate misunderstandings, but deliberate provocations by officials in
pursuit of hostile purposes.33

Has the era of benign neglect of churches by the state come to an end?
Considerable evidence suggests that the state is claiming such a wide scope
of regulatory authority that its operations impinge upon routine church

32

Two examples are Kent Kelly, The Separation of Church and Freedom (Southern
Pines, NC: Calvary Press, 1980); and Clayton L. Nuttall, The Conflict: The Separation
of Church and State (Schaumburg, IL: Regular Baptist Press, 1980).
33
See Franky Schaeffer, A Time for Anger: The Myth of Neutrality (Westchester, IL:
Crossway Books, 1982).
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activities.34 If this is true, it may be due in no small part to the high
premium many churches place on an entangling partnership with the state
in furthering either their own programs or those of the state.35 It does not
necessarily or in all cases indicate a malicious intent. If, in fact, the
religious institutions of our society are being brought under the effective
supervision and control of the state, their independence is perhaps being
most threatened by the logical consequences of an avowedly beneficent
purpose: that is, the equalization of economic and social opportunities for
all groups in our society.

It serves little purpose, however, to speculate about the motives or
intentions of legislators, bureaucrats, and judges. Although intent – where
it may be determined – does help confirm the direction of the changes,
what matters in this context is the impact of the policy changes. Despite all
the talk about secular purposes and neutral effects, what is the object of a
policy of religious pluralism – or syncretism – if not the formation of “a
more perfect union” on the basis of some variety of universalism? It is
precisely here – in the realm of ideology – that the concern of churches
with their doctrinal integrity and their customary immunity from state
intervention in the form of regulation or taxation may come into conflict
with the state's interest in ideological and administrative consistency.
Exceptions admitted by either side tend to dilute the impact of its claims to
authority in its proper sphere.36
34

Some degree of relief has been provided by Congress through the subsequent passage
of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act in 1993 and the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000. See Appendix.
35
See Morgan, Politics, 37-38.
36
William A. Stanmeyer, Clear and Present Danger: Church and State in PostChristian America (Ann Arbor, MI: Servant Books, 1983), 58, warns that if the
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How then may the current state of affairs best be understood? Have the
most important conflicts between church and state already been resolved
through a series of imperfect but generally agreeable compromises, or are
the complexities of the issues only just now coming to the surface?

The issue may be stated in terms of a conflict of jurisdiction between
church and state. As the state extends its operations into all areas of social
life, it breaches the protective “wall of separation” that has traditionally
kept the church free of obtrusive regulation by the civil authorities. The
widening scope of official state activity is manifested in several ways: first,
a statutory extension of state police powers through social legislation over
what are still widely regarded as ecclesiastical and domestic spheres of
authority; second, a restriction or pre-emption of certain activities
involving commerce, employment, and social relations -- whether
conducted in public or in private -- that were once held to be outside the
jurisdiction of the state; third, a vitiation of the principle of religious noninterference

through

judicial

interpretations

that

divorce

the

“establishment” and “free exercise” clauses of the First Amendment, and
fourth, an adversary posture toward churches being taken by many agencies
of the state while pursuing their regulatory objectives. 37 As a consequence,
Christian does not assert a particular constitutional right „then he abdicates the
protections that the laws have provided for him. Worse, he abandons these
protections for others.‟ On the other hand, weak cases often set bad precedents.
37
Stanmeyer notes, by way of illustrating the problem, the 1978 „proposed Revenue
Procedure on Private Tax-Exempt Schools,‟ which was delayed in its implementation
as a result of intense lobbying: „This 'procedure' was actually a substantive rule; it
proposed automatic loss of tax exemption for all private schools if found
'discriminatory' by a court or agency, or if they lacked a 'minority' student enrollment
of twenty percent of the 'minority school population' of the public school district in
which the private school was located. Further, the proposal set up a presumption that
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churches are facing new restraints on their ecclesiastical or corporate rights,
immunities, and privileges.

Several presuppositions that underlie this thesis have influenced the manner
of its investigation and elaboration.

First, religion is a comprehensive human activity that embraces all of life,
particularly the rules and values of society. The Christian theologian, R. J.
Rushdoony, maintains that „all law is enacted morality . . . and all morality
presupposes a religion as its foundation.‟38

Paul Tillich's very broad

definition of religion as an “ultimate concern,” which has been cited by the
Supreme Court, includes theistic, pantheistic, and atheistic religion within
its compass.39

Second, the comprehensiveness of religion means that religious neutrality
is a myth. Francis J. Powers has written that „an attitude of indifference or
neutrality toward religion, on the part of the state, is theologically and
philosophically untenable.‟40

the private school is discriminatory if it fails to have, among other things, 'an
increasing percentage of minority student enrollment' and 'employment of minority
teachers.' The only way the school could rebut this presumption would be to carry 'the
burden of clearly and convincingly' demonstrating that it did not discriminate on racial
grounds. It would be only 'rare and unusual' to find a school not enrolling some
minority students to be non-discriminatory.‟ Ibid., 113.
38
Rousas John Rushdoony, Law and Liberty (Fairfax, VA: Thoburn Press, 1977), 2.
39
United States v. Seeger (1965) 380 U.S. 187.
40
Francis J. Powers, Religious Liberty and the Police Power of the State: A Study of the
Jurisprudential Concepts Underlying the Problem of Religious Freedom and Its
Relationship to the Police Power in the United States With Special Reference to
Recent Decisions of the United States Supreme Court on the Subject (Washington,
DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1948), 46.
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Third, the American constitutional system is essentially Christian in its
foundational character and assumptions.

Justice William O. Douglas

acknowledged this when he wrote that „a “religious” rite which violates
standards of Christian ethics and morality is not in the true sense, in the
constitutional sense, included within 'religion,' the 'free exercise' of which
is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.‟41 From the bench, he reiterated an
assumption in Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952) that has
frequently been stated by the Court: „We are a religious people whose
institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.‟

Fourth, the legal heritage of our country is Christian at its roots. Sir
Matthew Hale's maxim that Christianity is part of the common law was
often cited by early members of the American judiciary, both in their
written opinions and their scholarly commentaries. For example, in his
treatise on constitutional limitations, Chief Justice Thomas M. Cooley of
Michigan wrote:

The Christian religion was always recognized in the administration of the
common law; and so far as that law continues to be the law of the land, the
fundamental principles of that religion must continue to be recognized in the
same cases and to the same extent as formerly.42

What may be concluded from these observations, finally, is that perhaps
too much attention has been paid to the alleged secularization of our
political institutions and not enough to the religious and political
41

William O. Douglas, An Almanac of Liberty (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and
Company, 1954), 304.
42
Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations Which Rest Upon
the Legislative Power of the States of the American Union, vol. 2, 8th ed. (Boston:
Little, Brown, and Company, 1958), 91.
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presuppositions that have favoured such an interpretation. In recent years,
it appears that the state has been assuming – whether intentionally or not –
the essential attributes of a church.43 Far from pursuing a separationist
course, the state has consistently attempted to convert churches and other
institutions into instruments of its own social programs and has enlisted
their cooperation or acquiescence by the granting and withholding of
favours.44 This is by no means an exclusively American problem. Writing
in the 1930s, Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy depicted it as part of a universal
modern trend:

The world owes it to the British Commonwealth that during the last
centuries, donations, endowments, voluntary gifts, have been the mainspring
of progress in many fields. Were it not for the right of man to do what he
liked with his property little would exist in religion, art, science, social and
medical work today. No king's arbitrary power was allowed to interfere
with a man's last will as expressed in his testament. On the independence of
10,000 fortunes a civilization was based that allowed for a rich variety of
special activities introduced by imaginative donors and founders. The ways
of life explored under the protection of an independent judiciary form a
social galaxy. Our modern dictators, however, are cutting deeply into this
tradition. This is achieved through progressive taxation of inheritance or
limitation of a man's right over his property, by subsidizing institutions, like
Oxford, which were independent formerly. . . . The famous Dartmouth case
43

This is nothing new. The state was usually the central religious authority in ancient
times. Other institutions serve much the same purpose, as suggested by Hazel Barnes,
The University as the New Church (London: C. A. Watts & Co., 1970). The
separation of religious and civil is unique to the biblical tradition, but it has been a
source of contention ever since church and state first joined in partnership during the
latter years of the Roman Empire. For the early modern period, see Otto Gierke,
Political Theories of the Middle Ages, trans. Frederic William Maitland (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1900; Boston: Beacon Press, 1958), 91.
44
See, for example, Lyle E. Schaller, The Churches' War on Poverty (Nashville, TN:
Abington Press, 1967), 77-79.
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which Daniel Webster won against the State (a striking example of the
progressive significance of the Whiggish principle) was tried only a century
ago; yet the conditions which made it possible for Webster to win are
rapidly vanishing, at least in Europe.45

Exemptions that were designed to protect religious liberties are now
perceived in some political circles either as customary privileges which are
not binding on the state or else as bargaining chips with which to advance
its policies. The wall of separation, as it now stands, appears to be a
permeable one that simultaneously consigns churches – often with their
cheerful cooperation – to a position of irrelevance within the contemporary
American culture and enables the state to absorb their traditional functions
and prerogatives. Indeed, a retrospective look at the record suggests that
the courts, legislatures, and bureaucracies of the land have become
involved in an experiment to gradually disengage our political system from
its dominant religious and legal heritage.46 Secular equivalents to religious
institutions now promote human relations, education, health, and welfare in
a manner reminiscent of William James's proposal for „a moral equivalent
of war.‟47

Although education has been at the centre of much of the conflict in recent
years, school issues are only the most visible part of a more fundamental
clash

of

religious

values.

Richard

E.

Morgan

regards

the

“governmentalization of welfare services” and the “educational revolution”
as the two major trigger issues that have led to a growing conflict between
45

Rosenstock-Huessy, Revolution, 29-30.
Hitchcock, Secular Humanism, 99-113.
47
William James, Pragmatism and Other Essays (New York: Washington Square Press,
1963), 289-301. „A Moral Equivalent of War‟ is the title of one of the essays.
46
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church and state due to the rise of a reaction in the 1960's against “the
traditional ideology of privatism.” Morgan adds:

These radical secularists tend to regard private charitable activity as illusory
and psychologically corrupting, and the notion of religious institutions
administering public funds is anathema.

Religious schools are seen as

especially regressive. . . . There is, it should be noted, a direct conflict
between the radical secularist demand for governmentalization of social
welfare and education, and the principle of "subsidiarity" which looms large
in Catholic social thought. As formulated by Pius XI, this holds that it is
"unjust" and "gravely harmful to turn over to a greater society . . . functions
and services which can be performed by lesser bodies. . . ." Thus families
and private associations should handle all possible functions, and nothing
which they are capable of doing should be displaced "upward" to
government.48

At stake is who or what will define the political and social agenda of the
future? It is a question of whose vision of the future, whose values, whose
religion will prevail. Since church and state are so influential in shaping
public opinion, both have long been utilized as ideological proving grounds
by various social movements seeking to mould society according to the
desire of their hearts. Possibly as a consequence, church and state now
claim overlapping spheres of authority. If they continue to find themselves
48

Morgan, Politics, 131-32. It would be a mistake, however, to regard this radical
secularism as something fundamentally outside and antithetical to the Judeo-Christian
religious tradition. Comparable views are expressed by many professing Christians.
See W. Stanley Mooneyham, What Do You Say to a Hungry World? (Waco, TX:
Word Books, 1975), 25-32; Ronald J. Sider, Rich Christians in an Age of Hunger: A
Biblical Study (Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press, 1917), 214-17. For a critique
of these views, see David Chilton, Productive Christians in an Age of Guilt
Manipulators: A Biblical Response to Ronald Sider, 2nd ed. (Tyler, TX: Institute for
Christian Economics, 1982), 184-86; Schlossberg, Idols, 243-50.
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at cross-purposes, each may be expected to assert an independent claim –
perhaps even a monopoly of competence – over areas of that are of mutual
concern.

More than any other social institution today, excepting the family, the
church derives its original identity and authority from a source that is
independent of the state.49 The church steadfastly maintains that it answers
to a higher authority regarding its sacraments, ceremonies, disciplines, and
doctrines. Otherwise it risks becoming a creature or appendage of the state.
The state is equally steadfast in upholding its immediate responsibility
regarding the protection of public health, safety, welfare, morals, and
peace. But the sphere of its interests has grown so large that the state is
again coming into direct competition with the church and has begun
asserting regulatory control over many church activities as a sovereign
right. The concept of the church as a “charitable public trust,” which is a
holdover from the days of established churches, has opened the door to
inroads by the state into church affairs as, for instance, in California, where
the Worldwide Church of God was temporarily placed into receivership by
the Attorney General and more than sixty churches were recently
threatened with sale for back taxes over a dispute concerning filing
requirements.50

Several consequences appear to follow from the expansion of jurisdiction
and the tightening of regulations by the state: first, a decline of civil and
49

Abraham Kuyper, Lectures on Calvinism (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans
Publishing Company, 1931), 99-109.
50
See Ted Witt, „Church Tax Veto Hits Home,‟ The Times-Advocate (Escondido, Cal.),
2 October 1980, C-1; Ted Witt, „Poway Church Nears Line in Filing Marathon,‟
Times-Advocate, 29 January 1982, A-5; Ted Witt, „Risking Jail for Freedom,‟ TimesAdvocate, 17 September 1982, A-2, A-8.
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religious liberty in those areas of public life where explicitly religious
expression is either excluded, as in the public school classroom and
auditorium, or where it is otherwise made unwelcome, as in the use of
some public facilities for religious gatherings and displays;51 second, a
withering away of independent public institutions – sometimes called
„mediating structures‟52 – in favour of agencies dominated, subsidized, or
otherwise regulated by the state; and third, an attitude among some public
officials that may be described as missionary, messianic, or authoritarian.53

The relationship between church and state tends to fall into one of several
categories: first, a union of church and state in which dissenters are
persecuted; second, a union of church and state in which dissenters are
tolerated; third, a separation of church and state in which believers are
persecuted; and fourth, a separation of church and state in which religious
liberty prevails.54 But these categories are not necessarily exclusive. In
ancient Rome, licensed religions were tolerated and unlicensed ones were

51

See Peter J. Ferrara, Religion and the Constitution: A Reinterpretation (Washington,
DC: Free Congress Research & Education Foundation, 1983), 1-13.
52
See Theodore M. Kerrine and Richard John Neuhaus, „Mediating Structures: A
Paradigm for Democratic Pluralism,‟ The Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science, 446 (November 1979): 10-18, hereafter cited as Annals;
Rockne McCarthy. Donald Oppewal, Walfred Peterson, and Gordon Spykman,
Society, State, and Schools: A Case for Structural and Confessional Pluralism (Grand
Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1981), 1-3. Lawrence Rosen
notes that the Supreme Court has given some recognition to the rights of what the
calls an „interstitial entity‟ – in this case, an Amish family and community –
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), and wishes to see the principle extended
further. Berman, „Interaction,‟ Mercer Law Review, 420-21.
53
For example, John McDermott, „Campus Missionaries: The Laying on of Culture,‟
The Nation, 208 (March 10, 1969), reprinted in Herbert G. Reid, ed., Up the
Mainstream: A Critique of Ideology in American Politics and Everyday Life (New
York: David McKay Company, 1974), 303-15.
54
See Sanford H. Cobb, The Rise of Religious Liberty in America: A History (New
York: The Macmillan Company, 1902; Burt Franklin, 1970), 7-18 passim.
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persecuted. Historical circumstances have also depended on whether the
state dominates the church or the church dominates the state. The prevalent
pattern since the rise of nation-states has been a union of church and state
in which the state dominates the church.
Historical experience – if not logic – shows religion and politics to be
inseparable. Each is an arena for the interplay of basic beliefs about human
nature, power, and society. Each is an expression of faith guided by
presuppositions that are never finally definitive or indisputable.55

V THE DYNAMICS OF THE PROBLEM
The dichotomy of church and state confronts us, initially and finally, as a
political problem. It is a problem that began at a specific place at a specific
time in a specific political context: the imperial reign of the Roman
Caesars. As one writer notes: „In ancient times, as in primitive society
today, there existed no problem of Church and State, for the very good
reason that no church, in the modern sense of the word, existed.‟56 While
the issue between them has not troubled all climes and all seasons equally,
it looms large in the history of the West. Religion at one time served
mainly as an accessory of statecraft.
55

The advent of Judaism and

Addressing himself to the writing of history, Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy remarked:
„Man is a name-giving animal. Conscious experience is the presupposition for a new
name. . . . Gettysburg, Saratoga, Yorktown, Marathon, are not facts, but creations of a
nation's memory. This creative process precedes historiography by as great an
interval as that by which it follows the confusion of the thousands of soldiers or
civilians who, among countless facts, did not know what it all meant. The
Peloponnesian War was in the hearts and bowels of the Greeks long before
Thucydides clarified its memory in the first scientific book on history.‟ RosenstockHuessy, Revolution, 693, 694.
56
T. M. Parker, Christianity and the State in the Light of History, Bampton Lectures
(London: Adam and Charles Black, 1955), 1.
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Christianity set new forces into motion that freed religious energies from a
preoccupation with parochial loyalties. How the church – specifically the
Christian Church – emerged independent of the state and how the two have
interacted since that time are foremost among the institutional forces that
have moded western civilization.

The problem may be explored in any of several dimensions. The political
dimension may be brought into focus with a question: How can two distinct
institutions, similar or overlapping in composition, make authoritative yet
independent claims to the obedience and loyalty of their members? The
durability of the coexistence of church and state may be regarded as a
major catalyst in the development of western political traditions. Their
rivalry in matters of jurisdiction often prompted accommodations which
have served as prototypes for subsequent political innovations. American
federalism, for example, owes many of its essential features to Puritan
political experiments in colonial New England.

Various constitutional

liberties and concepts of limited government derived much of their original
impetus from struggles for religious freedom.

This suggests another question: What circumstances permitted such a
conflict of authority to be resolved by limiting the jurisdiction of the state?
The ingredients for an understanding are stored in the laboratory of history.
Issues raised during earlier religious controversies provide a basis for
analysing current disputes. Early Christians and Jews challenged the state
cult of imperial Rome by refusing obeisance to Caesar as their lord or
master. Both groups sought immunity from the religious laws and had to
endure periods of official persecution while defending their distinct identity
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and way of life.

A third dimension, the ideological, is arguably the most important to a
recognition of what is at stake on both sides. It involves a different
question: How is it possible to establish and maintain a political consensus
without bringing all authority under one sovereign head?

Differing

perceptions of sovereignty, law, and citizenship may, after all, indicate
seriously divided loyalties. Where social institutions fall out of step with
each other and unifying traditions are weakened, even ordinary stresses
may threaten political disruption and demoralization. The ability of a
society to face change and conflict with unity and equanimity is a measure
of its moral health. Common values and a common political agenda are
generally preferred as a society's first line of defence. Normally this means
an assimilation of all groups and traditions to some existing or purposely
devised set of norms. This function is usually filled by a civil religion.

It is sometimes objected that the relationship between church and state is
not characteristically political and, compared with earlier eras, is no longer
a matter of particular concern in a modern secular society.

The

contemporary American church – if it may be described in the singular –
does not press a distinctly political claim.

Its ordinances are not

comparable in nature or force to those of the state. Moreover, people
expect that questions of faith today be left to the private dictates of
individual consciences. The church that addresses political issues or
otherwise imposes its separate will overreaches these customary limits at
its own peril.
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While this point may be conceded in part, it fails to consider the dynamic
nature of religion, particularly Christianity. Changes in political
circumstances or religious priorities may redefine, even shatter, any
existing accommodation between church and state. American political
institutions have long operated on the basis of shared moral values and
assumptions that derive in large part from the Bible and Christianity. 57 It is
worth considering whether and how well such institutions can work under a
deliberately secular, pluralistic regime. In the absence of a common moral
ground that can help channel conflict, secular or religious militancy may
stir up fear and reaction. The volume of current legislation and litigation
concerning religious issues is a sign of growing dissension over the proper
role of the state in religion and the church in public life.

As to whether this is a political question, then, the objection may be met
very simply: any association between church and state is unavoidably
political. On the one hand, the state values religion – at least in the generic
sense – as a means of upholding an ideological consensus and encouraging
civil peace. On the other hand, the Christian Church is historically called
to acknowledge „one Lord, one faith, one baptism‟ (Eph. 4:5): which is to
say, one citizenship in which all final authority is vested in a sovereign
God. Such a claim is treasonable if the state – if Caesar – is rightfully
sovereign. Here, as always, the issue is joined. It is a suitable point of
57

By connecting the declining influence of Christianity with a growing indifference „to
the hullabaloo of all verbiage,‟ Rosenstock-Huessy distinguished between the creation
of compelling names – an expression of a vigorous faith – and a mere „consumption of
words‟ that signals spiritual languish. Attempts to reformulate the country's Christian
heritage in terms of „a complete system of agnostic ethics and morality‟ are still based
on a „fundus of Christian standards implicitly lived.‟ See Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy,
The Christian Future: Or the Modern Mind Outrun (New York: Charles Scribner's
Sons, 1946; Harper Torchbooks, 1966), 6-11, 43-53.
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departure for a historical study of the problem.

APPENDIX: SUBSEQUENT CONTROVERSIES
This article is drawn from the first chapter, “The Imprint of Culture,” of the
author‟s doctoral dissertation.58

Many of the issues discussed above subsequently came to a head in
Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). The Supreme Court
held that the Free Exercise Clause permitted the State of Oregon to prohibit
the sacramental use of peyote through a neutral law of general applicability
and, thus, also to deny unemployment benefits to employees who were
discharged on these grounds.

This ruling met with strong opposition. Congress responded by passing the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, which, among other things,
used section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect religious rights
against action taken by the states. The Supreme Court struck down this
provision of the law in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). The
Court upheld the City‟s use of a historical preservation ordinance that
prevented a church from expanding its facility.

Congress subsequently passed the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act of 2000 in response. The new law bypassed the Court‟s
Fourteenth Amendment objection to the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act by using the Constitution‟s Spending Clause to require recipients of
58

Steven Alan Samson, Crossed Swords: Entanglements Between Church and State in
America. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oregon, 1984.
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federal funding to accommodate the earlier law‟s provisions regarding
religious freedom. Given that all localities rely on federal subsidies, the
resulting irony is almost whimsical. What more appropriate illustration
could there be of the much larger problem Congress itself has created: that
is, a regime of fiscal, educational, and social regulation which has spawned
so much First Amendment litigation in recent decades?

